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Abstract 
This paper uses two unique panel data sets to study the causal effect that armed conflict 
has over entrepreneurial activity in Colombia. Using a fixed effect estimation 
methodology at the plant level and controlling for the possible endogeneity of armed 
conflict through the use of instrumental variables, we find that a one standard deviation 
in the number of guerrilla and paramilitary attacks in a municipality increases the 
probability of firm exit in 8.1 percentage points. This effect is stronger for smaller 
plants and has a differential impact with respect to firms’ age. 
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1 Introduction 
In a recent study, Harbom and Wallensteen (2007) report that a total of 232 armed conflicts 
have been active in 148 locations since the end of the Second World War. This high 
incidence of armed conflicts around the world has significantly increased academic 
research on the possible impact of violence on several outcomes of interest. Most of this 
research has focused on the direct impact that conflict has on its victims and on the 
households residing in conflict areas. The questions in these studies include the impact of 
violence on forced migration (Morrison and May 1994; Ibañez and Velez 2005), 
households’ consumption and investment patterns (Verwimp and Bundervoet 2008; Grun 
2008), general health of individuals (Camacho 2008), and on the levels of education 
attainment and labor decisions of children exposed to conflict (Shemyakina 2006; 
Rodriguez and Sanchez 2009), among others.  
However, little attention has been given to the impact that conflict may have on firms’ 
decisions, performance, and activities. This is strange, given the importance that 
entrepreneurship and firms’ activities have on the economic performance in a country. 
Moreover, authors such as Iyigun and Rodrik (2004) and Munshi (2007), suggest that low 
levels of development are in part caused by low levels of entrepreneurship. Understanding 
if and how conflict affects economic activity at the firm level could provide governments 
and NGOs with insights on how to reduce the impact of conflict on economic activity and 
the development of a country. 
Among the few studies that have addressed the problem of firm activity and civil conflict 
we find Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1996). Using cross-country data, both studies 
show a negative relationship between political stability and economic growth. Similarly, 
Gaviria (2002) shows that firms’ sales in Latin America grow at a lower rate if 
entrepreneurs believe crime rates are at sufficiently high levels to interrupt business. Of 
course, this cross-country evidence, although suggestive, may suffer from omitted variable 
bias and reverse causality between poverty and conflict if not adequately controlled for. 
Hence, recent studies have focused on single country information in order to reduce these 
estimation problems. For instance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) used information in the 
Basque Country to estimate the impact that terrorist activities have on GDP, while Pshisva 
and Suarez (2006) established the negative impact that kidnaps have on firms’ investment 
decisions in Colombia.  
This paper enriches the existing literature by estimating the effect that armed conflict has 
on exit decisions of manufacturing firms. To do so, we use information from two unique 
panel data sets from Colombia that allow us to directly link firms’ activities with armed 
conflict intensity at the municipality level. We believe Colombia is an appropriate country, 
given that it suffers from one of the longest internal conflict still present today. Guerrilla 
and paramilitary groups have been active since the 1960s; they have committed several 
attacks in most of its national territory and with very high intensity during the 1990s, 
affecting in a negative and significant manner most of its population. These attacks have 
varied in intensity and geographical location during the years and hence provide sufficient 
variation to capture its effect on economic activity.  
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The information on entrepreneurial activities used in the present study comes from the 
Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS). This is a census of manufacturing plants with more 
than ten employees or annual production above 115.5 million pesos measured in 2005 
prices (around US$46,000) for the period 1993–2005. Information on armed conflict is 
obtained from a yearly data set at the municipal level constructed by CEDE (Centro de 
Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico–Universidad de los Andes) which contains the 
number and types of attacks perpetrated by both guerrilla and paramilitary groups in 
Colombia between 1988 and 2004. Our conflict measure is the sum of all attacks 
perpetrated by all the active armed groups in each municipality. This information is further 
complemented with information on government deterrence measures. 
We use three different approaches in order to obtain the causal link between armed conflict 
and firms’ exit decisions. The first one uses a panel-fixed effect estimation at the plant level 
where the contemporaneous armed conflict measure is our independent variable of interest. 
To control for possible endogeneity, the second approach uses a lagged armed conflict 
measure instead of the contemporaneous one. Our third and preferred strategy is an 
instrumental variable approach in which contemporaneous armed conflict is instrumented 
with lagged government deterrence measures.1 Under this last methodology we find that 
the average violence increases the probability of firm exit in six percentage points. If we 
evaluate this same effect with an increase in one standard deviation of the rate of attacks 
present in the municipality there is a positive and significant increase over the hazard that a 
firm exits of about 8.1 percentage points. Moreover, we find that this effect differs 
according to plants characteristics. Specifically, smaller firms are more likely to exit when 
civil conflict increases. Results show that violence also has a differential effect according to 
firms’ age.  
There are several differences between the previous research above mentioned and the one 
we present in this paper making an important contribution to the literature. The first one is 
related to the use of information from a single country with enough armed conflict 
variation. As known, this will reduce problems such as omitted variable bias, reverse 
causality, and measurement errors.2 Second, no study before has linked firms’ plant level 
data with violence data at the municipality level. 3 While Pshiva and Suarez (2006) use firm 
data level the linkage is only at the state level and they concentrate only on one type of 
crime. Furthermore, the information used in the cited study corresponds to general balances 
of the firms; this information reports the location of the firm as the place where it is 
registered. However, the place where the firm is registered is not necessarily the place 
where the firm operates, especially if firms have several production plants under the same 
                                                 
1 The intuition for choosing these instruments is closely related with recent research by Angrist and Kugler 
(2008). This will be explained in more detail later.  
2 On this last point, some of the studies in the literature use perception based crime or conflict levels that are 
not always necessarily accurate. Moreover, studies that use more formal crime or conflict measures may 
be difficult to interpret given the differences in registry and measurement of crime in different countries. 
We do not face such problems given that we use the same measure of armed conflict along the years for 
Colombia. 
3 Colombia has 31 states and 1120 municipalities within those states. 
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name. In our sample, we find that approximately 10 percent of the firms have more than 
one plant. This could measure how much firm misallocation could appear in the Pshiva and 
Suarez (2006) study. In our study we are able to match plant level information with violent 
acts committed directly in the municipality where the firms’ production plants are located.  
Third, the available data allows us to study the impact of violence on an entrepreneurial 
aspect that, as stated by previous authors, crucially determines the landscape of the 
economy, its jobs and development, but was not studied before: plant exit. We therefore 
provide a crucial link through which armed conflict affects economic development and 
growth at the micro-economic level. Last, but not least, the rich data available allows us to 
explicitly take into account the possible endogeneity of armed conflict through an 
instrumental variables approach which has never been carried out at the firm level before.  
Given our question of interest, this paper is also related to the literature that studies the 
determinants of firm exit decisions in different contexts. For instance, Alvarez and Görg 
(2009) and Bernard and Jensen (2006) study how foreign ownership affects plant deaths in 
Chile and the USA, respectively. Similarly, under a duration analysis framework, 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) find that survival rate not only depends on age and firms’ 
size, but it is also affected by the innovation rate at the industry level, capital intensity, and 
new firms with new branches. Even though all of these studies had information at the plant 
level they only controlled for industry-fixed effects. Finally, we should also mention the 
work by Eslava et al. (2004, 2008) who have studied plant exits in Colombia during the 
1990s. Their papers use information from AMS, the same source of information this paper 
uses. However, their focus is different since they relate plant exit to the major labor, trade, 
and financial reforms that occurred early in that decade, but do not control for the violence 
the country experienced during these years. Furthermore, we use slightly newer information 
that accounts for the years after the reforms took place and control for year-fixed effects to 
capture any reform done after 1993.  
2 Literature Review 
Most of the existing literature on the consequences of conflict on economic activity has 
focused on cross-country evidence at the aggregate level. The first studies undertaken by 
authors such as Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996), and Alesina and Perotti (1996) focused 
on analysing how political instability affected investment rates and economic growth at the 
national levels. Using cross-country data and different definitions of political instability or 
conflict, these authors find a negative relationship between these variables and economic 
activity. Similarly, Collier (1999) estimates that during conflict periods countries’ growth is 
approximately 2.2 percent lower than that obtained in peaceful times. Moreover, Stewart  
et al. (2001) find that 15 out of 16 countries that have experienced an internal conflict 
within its borders suffered a decrease in their GDP per capita.  
In a more recent study, instead of using aggregate data at the country level, Gaviria (2002) 
used information provided by around 100 middle and top managers from the private sector 
in 29 different countries. Controlling for firms’ characteristics as well as country-fixed 
effects, the author finds that both perceived corruption and crime have a negative and 
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significant effect on investment and employment growth at the firm level. Although Gaviria 
investigates both corruption and crime activity, it is worth noting the apparent importance 
that the former has compared to the latter. First, according to 53 percent of the interviewed 
managers, crime is an obstacle to doing business compared to 46 percent who think 
corruption is an obstacle.4 Second, his empirical strategy suggest that while corruption 
lowers sales growth by 30 percent, crime reduces it by 35 percent. Similarly, while 
corruption appears to have no effect over investment, crime reduces it by 16 percent. 
Of course, this cross-country evidence although suggestive may suffer from some 
limitations such as measurement error, omitted variable bias, and reverse causality between 
poverty and conflict if not adequately controlled for. Hence, recent studies have tried to 
solve these problems by using information regarding conflict in a single country in order to 
study its possible economic impact. Among these studies we find Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003) who evaluate the economic effects that terrorist activity performed by ETA has 
imparted in the Basque Country since its outset in the early 1970s. To do so, the authors 
carry out two different methodologies. In the first they construct a synthetic control region 
that should have a very similar economic potential to the one from the Basque Country 
before the conflict. They compare the economic evolution of this fictitious region with the 
actual path the Basque economy had. They find that the terrorist activity created a gap of 
almost ten percentage points between both measures of GDP per capita. In their second 
approach, the authors use the unilateral truce the terrorist group declared for one year in 
1998 and evaluate the performance of Basque companies’ stocks relative to the ones from 
other Spanish companies. They find the former outperformed non-Basque stocks during the 
period while the truce was credible. 
Even though there is a great potential for studying the effect of conflict in Colombia, 
Riascos and Vargas (2004) mention that there are few studies that estimate the impact that 
both violence and armed conflict have on economic growth. The first studies in the country 
by Rubio (1995) and Trujillo and Badel (1997) estimated the economic costs of conflict 
through accounting techniques and concluded that the total costs of armed conflict and 
illegal activities in the country amounted to 15 percent of the GDP. More recent research 
have used either time series information for the country (Querubin 2003; Vargas 2003; 
Cárdenas 2007), or have calibrated theoretical models to Colombian data (Arias and Ardila 
2003; Mejia and Posada 2003). However, all of these papers used aggregate level data such 
as GDP per capita or its growth rate.  
To the best of our knowledge, the only papers in the literature that relate conflict variables 
with firm level data for a single country are Pshisva and Suarez (2006) and Rettberg (2008). 
The latter carries out a survey on nearly 1,000 firms in Colombia’s six biggest cities asking 
their managers how armed conflict has influenced their operations. Through a descriptive 
methodology the author concludes that armed conflict in Colombia affects its firms through 
channels such as transaction costs, investment, expansion opportunities, and firm sales. 
Pshisva and Suarez (2006) use firm level panel data comprising nearly 10,000 firms for the 
period 1996–2002 and combine it with information on the number of kidnappings at the 
                                                 
4 This percentage increases to 67 percent for managers residing in Latin American countries. 
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state level in Colombia. The authors estimate the effect that kidnaps have on firms’ 
investment decisions under an OLS framework with fixed effects at the firm level. They 
find that a one standard deviation increase in firm-targeted kidnappings reduce the 
investment rate of the average firm from 0.29 percent to -0.28 percent of total assets. The 
authors suggest that the channel through which the effect of kidnaps are transmitted to 
investment is fear, and not demand, costs, or credit constraints.  
Even though previous researchers have studied the impact of armed conflict on economic 
activity none have used such detailed data as the one we use in this paper. The special and 
unique characteristics of the data used as well as the estimation strategies makes the present 
paper a contribution to the literature. Moreover, no study before has investigated the impact 
of armed conflict on firm exit decisions. 
3 Data 
In order to answer our research questions we use Colombian violence and firm level data. 
Colombia has two detailed and unique data sets that will allow us to study in depth how 
armed conflict affects entrepreneurial activity.  
3.1 AMS 1993–2005 
The Colombian AMS is conducted by the National Department of Statistics DANE starting 
1982 and ending 2005. This is a census of industrial plants with more than ten employees, 
or production above 115.5 million pesos in 2005 (this value is adjusted every year using the 
Producer Price Index).5 This is a unique data set of which one can construct a panel of 
firms by industry sectors over a long period of time. We will use information by year-plant 
on: wages and benefit payments, investments, value added of production, and entry and exit 
of manufacturing plants.  
The information we use in this paper relates to the years 1993–2004. We start our panel 
1993 because only from then on there is information about location (municipality) of the 
plant. Moreover, in 1992 DANE changed the coding of the plants and even though one 
could try to identify each plant of the new survey with past information some observations 
are lost and the methods are not anymore reliable, as documented by Eslava et al. (2004). 
With these restrictions in mind, we obtain a non-balanced panel including 12,714 plants 
during the period 1993–2004, accounting for 93,188 observations. These plants are located 
in 296 municipalities out of 1,120 municipalities of Colombia; they are well spread within 
the territory. Of course, most of the plants are located in big cities such as Bogota, 
Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga where almost 65.23 percent of the sample 
are concentrating. The remaining firms are located in 28 of the 32 states in Colombia.  
Table 1 shows a stable distribution of plants across years, with an average of approximately 
7,765 firms per year. We also include descriptive statistics of the number of plants that exit 
                                                 
5 In US$ this amounts to approximately US$46,000 using an exchange rate of COL$2,500 Colombian pesos 
per US$. 
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each year, with an average of 452. As observed, approximately 6 percent of all 
manufacturing firms in Colombia exit each year. Two important facts in our definition of 
exit should be noted. First, the survey is carried out to all plants with more than ten 
employees or with a production of above a given range. It could be the case that for a given 
year the plant had a lower number of employees, but the Statistics Department follows 
them to make sure they do not disappear from the panel until this condition of less than ten 
employees persists for more than three years. To make sure that we are not erroneously 
capturing such cases as exits we carried out all the empirical exercises with and without 
these small firms. All the results hold with this sample.6 Moreover, we only assume there is 
an exit if we never see the plant in the survey again, so we allow for the possibility of firms 
that are not followed for a year but then they reappear in the sample with the same 
identification number.  
In Table 2 we include statistics coming from the AMS for our dependent variable, firm exit, 
and for each of our control variables used in the empirical exercises such as: wages and 
benefit payments, investments, and value added of production. Across the decade we find 
that on average 5.83 percent of firms exit our sample, wage paid to production workers is 
480,325 (2004 pesos) and for sales workers is 897,650 (2004 pesos), which corresponds to 
1.34 and 2.51 of the 2004 minimum wage, respectively. Wages and investments are 16 
percent and 17.5 percent of total value added, respectively. We believe that these data does 
not have much biases in terms of firm selection, given that Law 79 of October 1993 
requires firms to fill out any survey provided by DANE. Moreover, every year DANE 
verifies with Confecamaras to send forms to new firms that qualify into the AMS, firms 
that will potentially enter into the panel receive pre-surveys to verify their characteristics to 
enter into the sample.  
3.2 Armed Conflict Data Base 1993–2004 
The Colombian conflict is one of the longest ongoing domestic confrontations in the world 
surpassed in length only by the Israeli–Palestinian and the Indian–Pakistani conflicts. There 
are three main irregular armed groups acting inside its borders. Specifically, there are two 
guerrilla organizations known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the National Liberation Army (ELN) both of which even though originated in 
communist ideas in the early 1960s are now also involved in drug producing and trafficking 
operations. The third group is a rightwing paramilitary group known as the United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) founded almost 25 years ago and which is now under a 
peace process with the government. All three groups, besides engaging in direct fight with 
the national army, also perpetrate crimes against the civil population, private assets, and 
public infrastructure. To finance themselves and try to get political power they kidnap both 
for extortive or political reasons and engage in drug production and trafficking.  
The information on this conflict used in this research comes from a balanced panel at the 
municipality level from 1988–2004, this data set has been collected along the years through 
                                                 
6 Although not presented in the paper, these results are available upon request.  
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different sources by CEDE at Universidad de los Andes.7 It has information on all attacks 
carried out by guerrillas and paramilitary groups; as well as deterrence and defensive 
actions taken by the government during this period.  
Our measure of conflict in this research will be the total number of attacks carried out by 
the armed groups against civilians, their private assets or the public infrastructure. 
Specifically, the total number of attacks will be the sum of explosive terrorist attacks, 
arsonist terrorist attacks, private property assaults, entity terrorist attacks, political terrorist 
attacks, route blocking, armed contact, ambushes, harassing, population incursions, other 
terrorist attacks, land piracy, and illegal road blockings. To get an idea of the variation in 
the intensity of the civil conflict inside Colombian borders, Figure 1 presents the average 
rate of attacks in each municipality between the years 1993–2008. From this Figure it is 
clear that conflict is widespread all over the country. Moreover, it varies in intensity across 
regions. It is precisely this source of variation that will allow us the identification of the 
effects of armed conflict on firm exit decisions.  
The average rate of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants in the municipalities where the firm 
plants in the AMS are located is depicted in Figure 2. This measure significantly increased 
after 1999 and only appears to start to decrease in 2004. Such pattern is consistent with the 
onset of President Uribe’s first term when the country was in a deep civil war and both 
guerrilla and paramilitary groups were active and very strong. Table 2 also presents the 
average of 2.42 and standard deviation of 3.14 for this measure of conflict. As can be 
observed, the latter is almost 30 percent higher than the mean suggesting that armed 
conflict intensity varies widely across Colombia.  
Table 2 also presents the average anti-narcotics operations as well as the number of drug 
laboratories dismantled by the army, navy, or the national police. On average there are 6.8 
anti-narcotics operations in each municipality and 1.2 laboratories dismantled per year. As 
will be explained in more detail later, these variables are of interest, because they will be 
used as instruments for the total attack rate, given that they proxy for deterrence actions 
from the government. As previously mentioned, all Colombian armed groups use drug 
production and distribution as a major financing source. Hence, higher values of such 
operations will necessarily be associated with a higher presence of government, police 
forces, and criminal groups in the municipality. This in turn will imply that deterrence 
actions should be highly correlated with armed conflict measures.  
3.3 Municipal Controls 
After merging the above data sets described, we included additional variables that could 
help us control for some fixed characteristics at the municipality level different from the 
level of violence. Among them we include the town surface with an average of 843.97 km2 
and an average distance of 53.57 km to the largest city in the municipality. Additional 
                                                 
7 Data was collected from Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), Policía Nacional, Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) 
and Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) among others. 
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descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in the last two lines of Table 2. We 
also include information that varies at the municipal level and overtime such as: 
government transfers received by each municipality and GDP levels of the State for each 
year. Their most relevant statistics are also presented in Table 2.  
4 Changes in Entrepreneurial Activity Due to Violence  
There are several channels through which armed conflict could interfere in the productive 
and commercial activities of the firm. One of the most named channels is that of 
uncertainty or fear. Naturally fear could reduce investment in both factors of production, 
labor and capital. As documented by Ibañez and Velez (2005) armed conflict could also 
affect firms’ employment if laborers flee the region due to fear of being killed. In some 
cases, it could also happen that some civilians may even join the armed groups if they are 
offered higher wages than those obtained in the legal market. To summarize, the amount of 
labor supply could vary in different ways: it could depend on the rate of within and between 
forced migration. Firms located in urban areas of municipalities which have migration from 
rural to urban areas will see their labor force increase. Firms located in areas where 
migration happens from rural and urban areas to other municipalities, could see a reduction 
in their labor force.  
Another direct impact of conflict may be related with changes in operational costs. It is 
plausible to imagine situations in which plants that are located in a violent area would need 
to increase security if private property is subject to acts of violence. In such cases either 
additional guard(s) or security systems need to be hired or implemented. Likewise, it could 
be the case that armed groups charge private firms extortion payments with the threat that if 
not paid direct terrorism acts could be aimed at the firms. Theoretically, such possibility has 
been previously analysed by Konrad and Skaperdas (1998).8  
Indirect effect for the firms may be numerous too. From the demand side, previous authors 
such as Verwimp and Bundervoet (2008) have shown that households’ consumption growth 
is reduced under conflict. Hence, it is no surprise that demand for products or services 
produced by the firms could be reduced and hence probably production, and sales would 
decrease, too. Moreover, the reduction in investment, production and sales could in turn 
reduce the number of laborers firms will want to hire. Finally, another indirect effect that 
could take place is an increase in credit costs or a reduction in available loans to firms. It is 
plausible that banks will be willing to lend money to firms located in violent regions only at 
higher rates so that the higher risks that such loans entail are covered. In extreme cases 
banks will simply close all the credit lines for such regions. 
                                                 
8 Specifically, for Colombia a recent example of such bribes is that supposedly made to Blockbuster by a 
guerrilla group. The multinational company refused to pay them the demanded bribe and on 27 January 
2009 a bomb in one of its stores was exploded in Bogotá. (More details in El Tiempo, 28 January 2009 
‘Autoridades atribuyen a extorsión atentado que dejó dos muertos en Bogotá’)  
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Through their influence in capital investment, labor hiring opportunities, changes in costs 
of production and effective customers’ sales armed conflict could have a significant effect 
on a firm’s exit decision. We can formalize these ideas using a simple model of firms’ 
decisions where we abstract from the impact of armed conflict on the supply of factors of 
production. Let us assume that the firm i in municipality m at time t produces with a 
traditional Cobb–Douglas production function that depends positively on the amount of 
capital (k) and labor (l): 
αα −= 1imtimtimt lAkY  where Y represents its production, A captures its 
production technology and α a constant between zero and one.  
Given the channels mentioned above, we will assume that violence could potentially affect 
investment in capital in each period.9 Specifically, if there is no armed conflict the value of 
the firms´ capital in period t will be its depreciated capital stock from previous periods plus 
any investment done in period t. Under a conflict a firm’s capital will be a proportion λ  of 
that same amount of capital where λ  is a parameter between 0 and 1 that varies in 
magnitude according to the intensity of the violent attack that could destroy partially or 
totally the capital owned by the firm.  
Under these assumptions, the expected value of firms’ i output will be given by:  
11 )()())(1( −− +−= αααα λ imtimtmtimtimtmtimt lkAvplAkvpY ,    (1) 
where )( mtvp is a number between 0 and 1 and represents the probability of having a 
violent attack in municipality m at time t. Having a positive probability that violent acts 
destroy infrastructure makes investment and hiring decisions harder and riskier. In some 
cases agents may rationally decide to reduce long term investments in factors of production 
in order to reduce the exposure of their wealth or reduce ties to that specific region. 
Another way to see it is that firms in a violent context not only need to be efficient in terms 
of production, but they should have some characteristics that help their factors of 
production survive to violent environments. 
Under these assumptions it can be easily shown that conflict will reduce a firm’s output. 
Holding that with a higher probability of having a violent attack production will reduce 
0
)(
<∂
∂
mt
imt
vp
Y
.  
Although this relationship between violence and production is clear the effect that violence 
can have on a firm’s exit decision is not necessarily obvious and hence the model needs to 
be extended. Under a traditional perfect competition model we know a firm will decide to 
exit the market if it cannot cover its fixed costs (FC). That is, if we define exit as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm decides to exit and 0 otherwise we will have: 
                                                 
9 We do not explicitly assume the firm will suffer a labor demand shock due to violence. However, the 
optimal labor demand will of course be different under armed conflict when the firm maximizes profits.  
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    (2) 
Benefits will be given by the difference between income and variable (VC) and FC:  
    (3) 
where fixed costs include the capital stock (kt) and variable costs include payroll (wlt), 
intermediate consumption goods (IC) and investments in period t (It): 
  (4) 
Replacing fixed and variable costs in equation (3) we get: 
    (5) 
If we allow revenue (PY) minus intermediate consumption (IC) to be total value added (VA) 
and replace it in (2) we obtain that:  
    (6) 
Now the effect that violence can have over firms’ exit decisions becomes ambiguous. On 
the one side, as shown above, it will definitely reduce a firm’s value added through a 
reduction in production. However, violence will also influence the optimal labor the firm 
demands, given its effect on the marginal product of capital and hence will reduce part of 
its variable costs.10 Moreover, violence could have a positive or a negative effect on 
investment. For fear motives firms may desire to cut back investments. However, if any 
attack destroys necessary capital firms will need to replace it and investment will 
necessarily increase. Under these circumstances, the effect of violence on firms’ exit 
decision may be unclear and the answer needs to be obtained empirically.  
5 Empirical Strategy  
Having in mind the channels above described, this paper empirically estimates the effect 
that armed conflict has over firm exit decisions for all Colombian manufacturing plants in 
the AMS between 1993 and 2004. Based on the model described in the previous section, 
we have that the reduced form of such decision will be given by: 
     (7) 
                                                 
10 Here of course we are assuming that wages are fixed as in a competitive model. In the empirical part we 
do not have this restrictive assumption given that we will control for labor costs, wages and number of 
laborers.  
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This is the basic structure that all the estimations presented in this paper will have. The use 
of the unique data described in section 3 will allow us to use panel data techniques to 
answer our question of interest. As it is well known, this technique is highly valuable given 
that, among other things, it allows the researcher to control for all the constant 
unobservables that could affect the outcomes of interest. For our specific case, panel data 
techniques could for instance control for the managerial abilities or political affiliation of 
the owners of firms that will indeed influence the decisions taken and hence the results 
attained by them. 
Specifically, the simplest specification that we estimate is given by: 
tmiittmitmtmitmtmi ufxdvy ,,,,5,4,,3,10,, +++++++= δγβββββ  ,  (8) 
where yi,m,t represents the exit decisions for firm i located in municipality m and at time t. 
The variable Vm,t represents the violence or armed conflict that took place in municipality m 
and at time t. As specified above, this variable captures the rate of attacks perpetrated by all 
the armed groups active inside Colombian borders in the period of study. We include tmid ,,  
as a variable that capture duration of the firm in the panel. The vector xm,t represents 
constant and time varying municipal characteristics such as the municipality area, the 
distance to the main city in the municipality, the GDP of the state, and transferences from 
the Central Government. The vector tmif ,,  represents firm characteristics changing over 
time, such as nominal investment, total nominal wages paid and added value all of which 
come from our theoretical model. Finally, γt, δi represent year- and plant-fixed effects, 
respectively, and μi,m,t is an error term assumed to be orthogonal to firm exit. 
Under specification (8), β1 is our coefficient of interest which will give an estimate of the 
effect that armed conflict has on plant exit. However, one must be cautious when 
interpreting this result, given that reverse causality and endogeneity could be biasing our 
estimation of β1. A growing literature has previously shown that economic activity is an 
important determinant on the onset and duration of civil conflict. Among some of these 
studies we find Collier and Hoeffer (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Miguel, 
Statyanath, and Sergenti (2004)—all using cross-country information—have found that 
levels and growth rates of GDP have a negative effect on armed conflict measures. There 
are many channels through which such reverse causality could emerge. For instance, lower 
economic activity may be associated with fewer labor opportunities or lower wages for 
young men. Under such scenarios it would be easier for armed groups to recruit new 
members and an escalation of the conflict could take place. Another possibility is that a 
firm’s location is endogenous to levels of violence. A firm will take into account violence 
conditions when deciding whether to open business or not. The strongest or more able firms 
to face conflict will open and stay. This will be tested in future work by estimating an 
equation for firm entry.  
For the reasons previously explained we must take into account the possibility of 
endogeneity in our conflict measure vm,t. To do so we follow two different strategies: the 
first one is to use lagged, instead of contemporaneous, measures of armed conflict (vm,t-1) as 
follows: 
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tmiittmitmtmitmtmi ufxdvy ,,,,5,4,,31,10,, +++++++= − δγβββββ .  (9) 
It is plausible to assume that firm managers will take into account the last period’s armed 
conflict intensity when making production decisions today or even entering into business. 
However, it is harder to come up with a story where production decisions of today will 
influence armed activity yesterday, eliminating possible reverse causality problems.11 
However, the problem with this approach is that if there is any inertia in the armed conflict 
measure or in economic activity lagged measures of the former will not necessarily solve 
the endogeneity problem.  
Hence, the second strategy is an instrumental variables approach in which we explain the 
armed conflict present in municipality m at time t with lagged laboratories dismantle mtz1  
and anti-narcotics operations mtz2 in municipality m at time t. Our first stage will be given 
by the following equation: 
tmiittmitmtmitmtmtm ufxdzzv ,,,,5,4,,3,22,110, ++++++∂+∂+∂= δγβββ
   (10) 
where violence in municipality m at time t is explained by all the exogenous regressors. We 
used these two instruments for two main reasons. First, the laboratories dismantle and anti-
narcotics operations rate in municipality m at time t should be highly correlated with armed 
conflict given that it serves as a measure of both the presence and effectiveness of the 
government to counteract criminal activity in the region. That is, we would expect to find a 
negative association between this government’s deterrence measure and armed conflict 
intensity, as will be shown in our first stage regression. However, note that both variables 
are related to drug production which is known to be the main financing source of the 
Colombian armed groups. Hence, if these groups try to protect such laboratories or 
production sites through armed attacks it could also be the case that a positive relationship 
between armed conflict and such deterrence measures could emerge. The second reason 
behind our choice of instruments is that we believe in their exogeneity. It is hard to believe 
that production and commercial decisions of managers today will be based on these specific 
central government deterrence decisions which are normally secret operations that occur in 
environments not easily detected by the civil population.   
It should be noted that a recent paper by Angrist and Kugler (2008) gives further support 
for our instruments. In their study, the authors find that indeed an exogenous upsurge in 
coca cultivation increased violence in the regions where it was produced. They explain that 
a possible mechanism through which this takes place is by the resources that drug 
production gives to Colombian armed groups. Furthermore, the authors also find little 
                                                 
11  Studies such as Collier and Hoeffer (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) have previously used lagged 
independent variables to solve reverse causality problems between economic activity and armed conflict. 
However, as previously mentioned their interest is in understanding how the former affects the latter. As 
detailed in Miguel, Statyanath, and Sergenti (2004) under such question the use of lagged variables is 
more doubtful given that economic actors could anticipate the possible conflict.  
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evidence to suggest that increased coca production benefited economic activity in the 
producing regions. Although the income of some rural dwellers increased, they argue that 
regional economies are not closely related to the drug business and that most of the 
resources from this activity go directly to the insurgent hands. Given that manufacturing is 
clearly a more urban and legal activity it is even harder to find channels through which anti-
narcotics deterrence actions should influence firm exit decisions.  
The instrumental variable approach is our preferred estimation strategy, not only because it 
addresses the endogeneity problem directly, but also because it could reduce any possible 
bias due to measurement errors or omitted variables as well. Of course both requirements 
for a good set of instruments will be tested empirically. That is, we will need to prove that 
both deterrence measures are strongly related with our variable of interest and that they are 
exogenous to firms’ exit decisions.  
6 Results  
A preview of our paper can be seen in Figure 3. It shows quintiles for the total attack rate 
and firm exit rate at the state level. We have information of entrepreneurial activity in most 
of the Colombian States, with the exception of three Eastern states. These are mainly rural 
states and hence it is not surprising that no manufacturing firm is located there. With some 
exceptions, the figure shows that in general there is a positive correlation between quintiles 
of firm exit proportion and attack rates. Of course, this simple relationship does not imply 
causality and more formal exercises as the ones described in the empirical strategy needed 
to be carried out. Different specifications of Equation (8 and 9) are presented in Table 3 as 
we gradually include controls into the regression. The first three columns are related with 
contemporaneous measures of armed conflict while the last three relate with lagged 
measures. Columns (1) and (4) include as controls only the duration variable as well as 
plant- and year-fixed effects; columns (2) and (5) add the municipal controls described 
above; and the last specifications include all the set of controls by adding firms’ specific 
characteristics that arise from the model in section 4. Even though we are controlling for 
fixed effects at the plant level the second and third specifications are possible, given that 
out of the 12,714 plants, 862 of them changed location during the period under study. 
Finally we should note that by adding firms’ controls such as value added, nominal 
investment, and total wages a significant number of observations are lost due to data 
restrictions.  
As shown in all specifications presented in Table 3, the contemporaneous intensity of 
conflict appears to have no effect over plant exit. All coefficients of interest in these 
regressions are actually 0. However, as described above, these results need to be interpreted 
with caution given the possible reverse causality that can exist between economic activity 
and armed conflict. The three last columns of Table 3 try to address the problem of reverse 
causality by using the lagged intensity of the conflict. As described above, while it is 
expected that economic activity of today could influence armed conflict today it is harder to 
believe that it could influence yesterday’s armed conflict. However, as can be observed in 
Table 3 there still appears to be no effect of violence on firm exit decisions as the 
coefficient of interest across all specifications remain equal to 0.  
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From Table 3 it can also be observed that the longer a firm appears in the panel the more 
probable exit is. In general, firms located in municipalities where the local government 
receives higher transfers from the central government are less likely to exit. In regards to 
the plants’ own characteristics we find that larger firms in terms of value added and those 
who have a bigger payroll have a lower probability of exiting. This result goes in line with 
those found in the exit literature such as Bernard and Jensen (2006) and Alvarez and Görg 
(2005) for the USA and Chile, respectively.  
Even though the lag strategy could in principle solve the reverse causality between armed 
conflict and economic activity if there is any inertia in the latter variable lagged measures 
of past conflict may not be a truly an exogenous variable. This would imply that our 
coefficient of interest could still suffer from a significant bias problem. Hence, we also 
decided to implement an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we evaluate the 
effect that armed conflict measures, instrumented by lagged laboratories dismantle and anti-
narcotics operations at the municipality level, has on entrepreneurial activities. This is our 
preferred strategy not only because it directly addresses the endogeneity problems but also 
because any bias due to omitted variables or measurement errors will also decrease.  
Table 4 presents the first stage regression of the instrumental variable (IV) approach, to 
check the appropriateness of the instrument used. The first and second column of Table 4 
present the instruments separately, while columns (3)–(6) present them jointly. For every 
specification, laboratories dismantle and antinarcotics operations of the previous period 
influence in a significant manner the level of armed conflict in the municipality 
independently of the controls used in the regressions. Moreover, the F-test shows that under 
these specifications we will not suffer from any weak instrument problem given that in each 
case the statistic is significantly higher than ten. 
The last column of Table 4 presents the coefficients associated with our two instruments 
after including all control variables and fixed effects. We find that if laboratories dismantle 
increases in one unit our armed conflict measure increases in 0.128 units. For anti-narcotics 
operations, we find that if this variable increases in one unit, armed conflict measure 
decreases in 0.008 units. The specific fact that both deterrence measures have the opposite 
sign is something that can be easily explained. On the one hand, if the deterrence measures 
carried out by the government are effective and can be maintained, over time it is expected 
that they should reduce future conflict in the municipalities where they are applied. The 
positive sign, however, can also emerge, due to policy endogeneity. As mentioned before, 
Colombian armed groups financially depend on drug production and trafficking. Hence, it 
is expected that if the government tries to reduce such activities the guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups will increase the armed attacks in their location of interest and fight to 
maintain their illegal business. Independently of the story we experience, the important 
aspect of our instruments is that as demonstrated above they are highly correlated with our 
armed conflict measure.  
Even though relevance of the instruments has been proven, we also need to address the 
exogeneity of our chosen instruments and the endogeneity of the armed conflict measure in 
the exit specification. Both these questions are answered in the lower panel of Table 5 
which presents the results for the Sargan- and endogeneity test of the instruments and 
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armed conflict, respectively. In the former test the null hypothesis is that, assuming that one 
of the instruments is exogenous, the second one is also exogenous. None of the Sargan-tests 
from different specifications in Table 5 reject the null hypothesis under a reasonable 
significance level. The null hypothesis of the endogeneity test is that the armed conflict 
measure is an exogenous variable in the empirical specification and hence no IV procedure 
should be needed. In this case however, we reject such hypothesis in all specifications with 
a one percent confidence level implying that an IV estimation is indeed needed. As 
mentioned, the possible endogeneity problem is that if economic or labor conditions are 
difficult in a given community and firms have to close their productive plants, laborers 
feeling discouraged may join the armed groups and increase the violence in the place where 
they reside.  
The results of the second stage for the exit decision of plants are presented in Table 5. 
Under the two stage procedure we can observe that armed conflict has a positive and 
significant effect on plant exit. Column (1) shows that after controlling only for plant-fixed 
effects, year effects and duration of the firms, the hazard rate that plant exits the market 
increases in 8.1 or 6.2 percentage points with a one standard deviation in the total attack 
rate or evaluated at the mean, respectively. Columns (2) and (3) of the same table show the 
results after including both municipalities’ and firms’ characteristics as control variables. 
As can be observed, the negative effect of armed conflict remains and is highly stable even 
though for the last specification we lose a significant number of observations. This negative 
effect is of course, at least in the short run, negative for the municipality’s economy given 
that jobs will be lost and poverty could increase. Furthermore, precarious socio-economic 
conditions could lead to increases in armed conflict creating a vicious circle.  
Finally, we also investigate whether certain types of manufacturing plants are more 
vulnerable to the negative effects of armed conflict than others. Specifically, we investigate 
whether the size or the age of the firm influence the magnitude of the effect of armed 
conflict on exit decisions. To answer the first question we divided the sample in three 
excluding groups according to the number of laborers each plant hires and ran the two-stage 
least square (2SLS) on each group separately. Specifically, the first group encompasses 
those firms that hire less than 500 laborers; the second group includes those that hire 
between 500 and 1000 laborers; while the third group encompasses the remaining plants. 
Each group contains 65.36 percent, 30.79 percent, and 3.84 percent of the total number of 
manufacturing plants, respectively. Table 6 shows that all the effect previously found 
appears to be driven mainly by the negative impact armed conflict has on small 
manufacturing plants.12 After including municipalities’ and plants’ characteristics the 
impact of one more attack on the exit probability of firms’ increases in 4 percentage points. 
This last result goes in line with that found by Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) in which 
under extortion the smaller and less productive firms are the ones forced to exit the market.  
                                                 
12 For those firms with more than 1000 employees the last specification with firm controls is not reported in 
Table 6 given that we have perfect prediction. The reason for this is that there is no large firm with 
complete information that exited the market during our period of study. 
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To analyse how the age of the firm may influence the armed conflict impact we also 
divided the sample into three groups, as follows: those firms younger than five years, those 
between five and ten years and those that were older than ten years. We then ran the 2SLS 
estimation on each group separately and the results of these estimations are presented in 
Table 7. Armed conflict appears to be increasing the likelihood of exit for either very young 
or very old firms. This could be explained by lack of experience and obsolescence, 
respectively, which could make them much more fragile and prone to armed conflict risks.  
7 Conclusion 
Using a combination of two unique data sets this paper estimates the effect that armed 
conflict has on exit decisions of manufacturing firms in Colombia. Having one of the 
longest ongoing civil conflicts in the world, Colombia is a good example to analyse this 
subject. Moreover, the availability of a panel data set at the plant level allows us to estimate 
how managers’ and owners’ decisions are influenced by civil conflict, a topic that has not 
been addressed before. Under an instrumental variable methodology, which controls for 
possible reverse causality problems, we find that armed conflict has a significant effect in 
the exit decisions of the plants. This effect appears to be larger for smaller, less 
experienced, or obsolete firms 
The present research is a first step to fill an important gap in the conflict and economy 
literature. Contrary to previous studies based on cross-country information or aggregate 
variables such as GDP growth, we are able to understand which and how firms’ decisions 
are influenced by armed conflict. These first results contribute to the understanding of the 
possible direct channels through which conflict influences economic activity. They also can 
enrich the knowledge of governments and NGOs in order to design suitable policies that 
aim to counteract the negative consequences of war and reduce its negative consequences 
on development.  
This is a very young research question and hence further research is needed to understand 
the effect of conflict over other important entrepreneurial decisions. Among them we 
should mention the effect on capital stock and investment decisions, number of employees 
hired at the plants, the proportion of male and production laborers, and real wages paid by 
the firms. 
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Table 1: Number of firms and firms that exit by year 
Year Number of firms Firms that exit 
1993 7,660 473
1994 7,487 462
1995 7,908 427
1996 8,173 452
1997 8,323 711
1998 7,863 462
1999 7,441 352
2000 7,986 485
2001 7,631 365
2002 7,543 577
2003 7,645 368
2004 7,528 296
Total 93,188 5,430
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004.  
Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2: Annual manufacturing survey, armed conflict, geographic and firm controls—descriptive 
statistics 
  Obs. Mean St. Dev Min. Max. 
Firm exit proportion (%) 93,188 5.83 23.43 0.00 100.00 
Total attack rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) 93,188 2.42 3.14 0.00 154.61 
Municipality surface (1000 km2) 93,188 0.84 0.72 0.02 6.79 
Average distance to largest city (1000 km) 93,188 0.05 0.10 0.00 1.03 
State's GDP (per capita Real prices (1994) 
millions Colombian pesos) 
93,188 2.14 0.53 0.55 7.48 
Transferences (trillions Colombian pesos) 93,188 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.96 
Ln Total Nominal Wage Paid (thousands 
Colombian pesos) 89,617 11.66 1.53 0.00 18.03 
Ln nominal investment (thousands Colombian 
pesos) 51,127 9.50 4.94 -17.48 20.59 
Ln added value (thousands Colombian pesos) 49,997 12.86 1.91 3.78 19.97 
Anti-narcotics operations (t-1) 93,188 6.84 9.72 0.00 44.00 
Laboratories dismantle (t-1) 93,188 1.21 1.70 0.00 21.00 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3: Effect of contemporaneous and lagged armed conflict measures on exit 
Dependent variable Exit-duration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total attack rate 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] 
Total attack rate (t-1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Duration 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Market distance -0.247** -0.177 -0.245** -0.182 
[0.124] [0.306] [0.124] [0.306] 
Municipality surface 0.007 -0.02 0.007 -0.02 
[0.008] [0.017] [0.008] [0.017] 
Transferences -0.021*** -0.014** -0.021*** -0.014** 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] 
State's GDP 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.011 
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] 
Ln nominal investment 0 0 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ln total wages -0.045*** -0.045*** 
[0.004] [0.004] 
Ln added value -0.023*** -0.023*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes 
Observations 93,188 93,188 37,018 93,188 93,188 37,018 
Note:  Clustered standard errors by firm in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: First stage regressions 
Dependent variable Total attack rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Laboratories dismantle (t-1) 0.026*** 0.072*** 0.098*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.013] [0.016] 
Anti-narcotics operations (t-1) -0.021*** -0.025*** 0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
F-excluded instruments 13.36 202.50 154.50 75.03 61.36 34.72 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes 
Observations 93,188 93,188 93,188 93,188 93,188 37,020 
Notes:  Clustered standard errors by firm in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5: IV results of contemporaneous armed conflict measures on exit 
Instruments 
Laboratories dismantle anti-narcotics 
operations 
Dependent variable Exit-duration 
(1) (2) (3) 
Total attack rate 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.008] 
Duration 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Market distance -0.083 0.18 
[0.147] [0.344] 
Municipality surface -0.01 -0.040* 
[0.010] [0.020] 
Transferences 0.006 0.018 
[0.009] [0.011] 
State's GDP 0.029*** 0.035*** 
[0.009] [0.013] 
Ln nominal investment 0 
[0.000] 
Ln total nominal wages -0.043*** 
[0.004] 
Ln added value -0.024*** 
  [0.003] 
Sargan-test 
Chi-sq(1) 0.261 0.024 0.314 
p-value 0.610 0.877 0.575 
Endogeneity test 
Chi-sq (1) 18.915 14.574 12.798 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes 
Observations 92,096 92,096 36,233 
Note:  Clustered standard errors by firm in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6: IV Results of contemporaneous armed conflict measures on exit by size 
Instruments Laboratories dismantle anti-narcotics operations 
Dependent variable Exit-duration 
  Size=1 (Employees<500) Size=2 (500<=Employees<1000) 
Size=3 
(Employees>=1000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) 
Total attack rate 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 0.010* 0.008 0.012 0.02 -0.032 
[0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.093] [0.049] 
Duration 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.017** 0.021*** 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005] 
Market distance -0.166 0.735 -0.148 0.098 -1.501 
[0.294] [0.945] [0.120] [0.137] [1.117] 
Municipality surface -0.036** -0.114*** 0.015* -0.004 -0.278* 
[0.018] [0.039] [0.008] [0.012] [0.154] 
Transferences 0.008 0.047** -0.008 -0.007 0.017 
[0.012] [0.021] [0.009] [0.010] [0.057] 
State's GDP 0.042*** 0.075*** -0.008 0.004 -0.238** 
[0.013] [0.024] [0.009] [0.012] [0.111] 
Ln Nominal 
investment 0 0 
[0.000] [0.001] 
Ln total nominal 
wages -0.059*** -0.034*** 
[0.006] [0.006] 
Ln added value -0.023*** -0.019*** 
  [0.003] [0.004] 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes 
Observations 59,495 59,495 21,104 28,081 28,081 14,298 3,012 3,012 
Notes:  Clustered standard errors by firm in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7: IV results of contemporaneous armed conflict measures on exit by age 
Instruments Laboratories dismantle anti-narcotics operations 
Dependent variable Exit-duration 
  Age=1(<5) Age=2(>=5 & <10) Age=3(>=10) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Total attack rate 0.023 0.015 0.041* 0 0.013 -0.021 0.021** 0.017** 0.025*** 
[0.015] [0.014] [0.021] [0.054] [0.050] [0.102] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] 
Market distance 0.372 1.807 -0.768 -3.197 -0.228 0.07 
[0.302] [2.258] [0.629] [2.108] [0.208] [0.364] 
Municipality surface -0.019 -0.118 0.012 0.02 -0.009 -0.029 
[0.019] [0.111] [0.052] [0.131] [0.015] [0.025] 
Transferences 0.013 0.082 -0.041 -0.078 0.006 0.022** 
[0.027] [0.060] [0.040] [0.116] [0.011] [0.011] 
State's GDP 0.037* 0.014 -0.017 -0.073 0.014 0.036** 
[0.020] [0.050] [0.031] [0.047] [0.013] [0.016] 
Ln nominal investment 0 0.001 0 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Ln total nominal wages -0.048*** -0.081*** -0.047*** 
[0.013] [0.015] [0.004] 
Ln added value -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
  [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,578 22,578 4,471 17,976 17,976 5,645 49,892 49,892 25,049 
Notes:  Clustered standard errors by firm in brackets.  
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1: Total attack rate by municipalities (Colombia 1993–2004) 
 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004. CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2: Total attack rate over time (per 100,000 inhabitants) 
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Figure 3: Total attack rate and firms’ exit proportion by state (Colombia 1993–2004) 
 
Source: DANE, AMS1993–2004, CEDE.  
Authors’ calculations. 
  
